LESSONS LEARNED IN LIBYA
16 11 2011
The Libya War which lasted for six months has drawn to an end. A transitional administration has been established in Libya. However, provisional administrations had also been set up in Afghanistan and Iraq as soon as possible. They later had problems maintaining stability. In Libya the Gaddafi regime may have been toppled. However, it is not yet possible to talk of a more certain future for Libya, as compared to Afghanistan or Iraq.
That NATO has resisted the urge to hurry and waited patiently for the rebels to win victory might be seen in positive light. However, the time passed has increased the destruction of Libya and the death numbers of Libyans. It will never be known how many Libyans actually died in this war. The cost of the war to Libya will only become apparent in the long term. It is possible that the cost of meeting the damage wrought by the war will be great. The Un Security Council decision should have been based on the criterion of fewer deaths in Libya.
The Libyan War was waged with the authority lent by decision 1973 of the UN security Council. On the 1th of March 2011, the UN Security Council had demanded that “all necessary measures be taken” and that “civilians be protected”. Of course the issue of civilians is highly open to interpretation. Based on images coming out of Libya for months, it is impossible to tell who the civilians really are even with the best of faith. However, the relevant decision and the intervention may be taken as an example around the world from now on.
The decision had also foreseen the operation relying on aerial and naval force and had forbidden the use of land forces. There has been no serious violation of this condition except for the small number of “experts” and “consultants” infiltrating the country. These teams were composed of British, French, Qatari and UAE special forces who worked for their respective armies, were in contact with the NATO and ensured the coordination of airplanes and the rebels on the ground.
The UN Security Council decision had not called for “regime change” or the “fall of Gaddafi” in Libya. However, due to the nature of the decision –the protection of civilians- it was clear that regime change and the fall of Gaddafi would be reflexive results. The UN Security Council acted very carefully and took a decision that took into account every possibility; before leaving the process to run its course.
Libyan rebels rose up with scant military knowledge and equipment. Had they lost, it would have been the end for them. But NATO support changed their fate. They managed to defeat the collected Libyan army, even if it took six long moths. NATO did not hurry. It did not choose to topple the Gaddafi regime through a heavy barrage of fire. NATO did not allow for the war to engage the world public opinion greatly.
NATO intervention was limited and in keeping with the rules. NATO –undoubtedly- was in full compliance of the UN Security Council decision. The USA chose not to be at the fore of the operation. The USA contributed valuable resources such as intelligence, communications, observation, identification and tanker aircraft to the operation. This time, the USA did not accuse those not participating in the operation as being enemies. In this operation, the USA did not come to contradict the USA.
NATO intervention took place on the 31st of March 2011. However, the real intervention began on the 19th of March with the involvement of the USA, the UK and France. Transition was very smooth in this process. Aerial operations gave the rebels a major advantage. The advance and capabilities of the weak army of the Gaddafi regime was stopped. Whatever the military capacity of the regime enjoyed, from artillery units to command headquarters and from simple vehicles to ammunition depots were rendered unusable in this way.
The aerial assaults were carried out by the USA, the UK, France, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Norway and the UAE. The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Qatari Jordan and Turkey patrolled the no-fly zone without carrying out assaults. However, the views of alliance members taking part in the operation on Libya and Libya’s future were not homogenous. While some NATO members such as Germany and Poland did not join the operation at all, others preferred very limited involvement. The Libyan experience has shown NATO that the participation of all members is not necessary if the alliance needs to become party to a war or conflict. In operations from now on, NATO might act with a core group of members as it did in Libya. For this reason it may now be said that NATO is in a new phase and that it now has double gears.
Despite the claims by the Gaddafi regime during the war that NATO bombardment was causing civilian casualties, it seems that there were no civilian losses during the operation. After the negative experiences of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, this time it seems the operation was carried out without fiascos.
This was how the legal framework, the political grounds and the military dimension of the operation were formed. The Gaddafi regime had never presented a major threat to the free world. Gaddafi’s army was weak. Gaddafi2S oil, in terms of the present market, does not amount to anything determining.
Perhaps it may be seen as a conspiracy theory. However, there a number of reasons to think that Libya was a laboratory and Libyans were subjects. In fact, it may even be thought that with all its dimensions and phases, the Libyan War was a dress rehearsal.